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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. R. BAGNALL, aka JOSEPH R. BAG-
NALL, and FLORENCE BAGNALL, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
UNITED PAINT & COLOR COM 
PANY, et al., 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Motion for summary judgment and decree of quiet 
title by defendants. 
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
An Order of Summary Judgment and Decree of 
quieting title was granted in favor of United Paint & 
Color Company on March 26, 1974. The Appellant's 
motion for Judgmenit Notwithstanding the Verdict or, 
in the alternative, for a new trial was denied by the 
Court on June 25, 1974. The Appellants thereupon bring 
this appeal. 
Case No. 
13753 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant (plaintiff) seeks relief from Summary 
Judgment and Decree Quieting Title and they them-
selves seek a summary judgment and decree quieting 
title for plaintiffs, or in the alternative, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents were joined as defendants by plaintiffs 
in a suit for judgment and decree contending that each 
defendant had defaulted under the terms of a real estate 
contract. 
Plaintiffs' original complaint alleged that defendant, 
United Paint & Color Company, was an alter ego of an-
other defendant, Reed R. Maxfield. In a motion to dis-
miss, defendant denied that it was an alter ego of Reed 
R. Maxfield. In an Amendment to the Amended Com-
plaint, plaintiffs further alleged that defendant, United 
Paint & Color Company, claimed a fee interest in cer-
tain properties also claimed by plaintiffs and the subject 
of the general suit. The defendant, United Paint & Color 
Company, admitted the fee interest was claimed by it 
and counterclaimed for summary judgment and a decree 
of quiet title in themselves. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE VALIDITY OF THE DEED FROM 
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JEAN B. NYBERG SHIRK TO UTAH VAL-
LEY LAND AND DEVELOPMENT CORPO-
RATION IS A MATERIAL QUESTION OF 
FACT. 
At the time of the alleged conveyance by Mrs. Shirk 
to Utah Valley Land & Development Corporation on 
March 3, 1962, no such corporation existed and, there-
fore, no grantee was in existence and no conveyance oc-
curred (R. 87). 
It is undisputed that Utah Valley Land & Develop-
ment Corporation never existed; however, it is conceded 
that a certain Utah corporation called Utah Valley Land 
& Development Company was formed subsequent to the 
attempted conveyance. On March 19, 1962, the Articles 
of Incorporation of Utah Valley Land & Development 
Company were purportedly signed and the corporation 
was incorporated March 23, 1962, which was twenty days 
aftier the attempted conveyance to Utah Valley Land & 
Development Corporation on March 3, 1962. 
23 Am. JUT. 2d, Deeds, Section 43, page 105, states: 
"In order that an instrument may be operative 
as a deed conveying title to, or interest or es-
tate, in land, the grantee named in the deed 
must be a person, natural or artificial, in ex-
istence at the time of conveyance and capable 
of taking title." (Emphasis added.) 
It is interesting to note that the attempted convey-
ance of the property occurred in California (R. 107). 
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The above citation also expresses the California rule. 
See Burns v. Gable, 291 P. 2d 969, 138 C. A. 2d 280, cer-
tiorari denied, 77 S. Ct. 145, 352 U. S. 913, L. Ed. 2d 120. 
The rule is simply stated in James v. Unknown 
Trustees, 220 P. 2d 831, 213 Okl. 312: 
"There must be a grantor and grantee in order 
that there may be a valid deed and grantee must 
have legal existence." 
In the case at bar, the corporate grantee at the time 
of attempted conveyance did not have corporate existence; 
therefore, there was no grantee. Even Mr. Virgil Red-
mond who represented the alleged corporation at the 
time of the attempted conveyance said that "Mrs. Shirk 
deeded it directly to the Utah Corporation called Utah 
Valley Land & Development . . ." (R. 118). Mr. Red-
mond used a name different than that used on the deed 
as grantee to-wit, "Company" vis a vis "Coloration". 
This would indicate that at the time of the negotiations 
with Mrs. Shirk the name of a corporation to be formed 
had not yet been decided upon. 
POINT II. 
WHETHER PLAINTIFFS, J. R. BAGNALL 
AND FLORENCE BAGNALL, WERE PUR-
CHASERS IN GOOD FAITH IS A MATER-
IAL QUESTION OF FACT. 
There exists a certain warranty deed signed by Jean 
B. Nyberg Shirk purporting to convey a certain piece 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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of land containing 140.15 acres to Utah Valley Land & 
Development Corporation. This deed was signed March 
3, 1962, and it it was recorded on October 20, 1971 (R. 
72). 
Another deed exists which also was signed by Jean 
B. Nyberg Shirk purporting to convey the same piece 
of property to Mr. & Mrs. Bagnall as joint tenants. This 
deed was signed May 20, 1971, and was recorded May 
28, 1971, approximately five months before the above 
mentioned warranty deed was recorded (R. 92, 93, & 
94). 
A third deed exists in which Utah Valley Land & 
Development Corporation, as grantor, has purported to 
convey the same 140.15 acre piece of property to the 
present defendant, United Paint & Color Company. This 
deed was signed October 5, 1971, and it was recorded 
October 20, 1971, approximately five months after the 
deed to the Bagnalls was recorded (R. 72A). 
In support of the plaintiffs' opposition to summary 
judgment, Jean B. Nyberg Shirk, Vern Shirk, her hus-
band, Florence Bagnall, and Joseph R. Bagnall have 
signed affidavits which were attached to and made a 
part of plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition to summary 
judgment (R. 90, 95, 126 and 128). 
The affidavits of Mr. & Mrs. Bagnall aver that they 
were not aware of the prior transaction between Mrs. 
Shirk and Utah Valley Land & Development Corpora-
tion and that they had no notice of any such transaction 
(R. 90, 95). 
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The affidavits of Mr. & Mrs. Shirk aver that the 
transaction with Utah Valley Land & Development Cor-
poration took place on March 3, 1962, and that the prop-
erty was deeded and the conveyance made directly to 
the corporation on March 3, 1962 (R. 126, 128). 
The deed from Jean B. Nyberg Shirk to Utah Valley 
Land & Development Corporation was not recorded be-
fore the deed from Jean B. Nyberg Shirk to Mr. & Mrs. 
Bagnall had been recorded. 
Utah law is specific in an instance where a deed 
has not been recorded and there are subsequent pur-
chases in good faith. 
"U. C. A. 57-7-3. Effect of failure to record — 
Every conveyance of real estate hereafter made, 
which shall not be recorded as provided in this 
title shall be void as against any subsequent 
purchaser in good faith and for a valuable con-
sideration, of the same real estate, or any por-
tion thereof, where his own conveyance shall 
be first duly recorded." (Utah Code Annotated, 
1953.) 
The affidavits of Mr. & Mrs. Bagnall reflect that 
they were purchasers of the property in good faith for 
value. This is a fact question for the jury. Certainly 
the Bagnall deed was recorded before the deed of the 
defendants. "The record is prima-facie evidence of the 
facts therein stated . . ." Tarpey v. Deseret Salt Com-
pany, 5 U. 205, 14 P. 338 (1887). 
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POINT III. 
A SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE 
GRANTED ONLY IF THERE IS NO GENU-
INE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT 
AND THAT THE MOVING PARTY IS EN-
TITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER 
OF LAW. 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah State Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure provides: 
"The judgment sought shall be rendered forth-
with if the pleadings, depositions, and admis-
sions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is en-
titled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Em-
phasis added.) 
The Utah Supreme Court in Young v. Felornia, 244 
P. 2d 862 (1952) interpreted the above rule thus: 
"Under this rule, it is clear that if there is any 
genuine issue as to any material fact, the mo-
tion should be denied." 
As to summary judgments, the Utah Supreme Court 
in Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 Utah 
2d 1, 354 P. 2d 559 (1960), stated, 
"A summary judgment must be supported by evi-
dence, admissions, and inferences which when 
reviewed in the light most favorable to the loser 
shows 'that there is no genuine issue as to any 
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material fact and that the moving party is en-
titled to a judgment as a matter of law.' Such 
showing must preclude all reasonable possibility 
that the loser could, if given a trial, produce 
evidence which would reasonably sustain a judg-
ment in his favor.9' (Emphasis added.) 
Also in Thompson v. Ford Motor Company, 16 Utah 
2d 30, 395 P. 2d 62 (1964), the court stated: 
"On summary judgment the adversed party is 
entitled to have the court survey the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences fairly to be drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to him.'9 
(Emphasis added.) 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the facts in this 
case clearly demonstrate that there was a justiciable issue 
of fact concerning the matters upon which the Court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the United Paint 
& Color Company. Reasonable men could differ con-
cerning the interpretation of these facts and, therefore, 
the plaintiffs are entitled to have the summary judgment 
vacated and the matter remanded for trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACKSON HOWARD, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs-Appellants 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
